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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a variant of the IMF's Global Economic Model (GEM) suitable to analyze
macroeconomic dynamics in open economies, and uses it to assess the effectiveness of Taylor rules
and Inflation-Forecast-Based (IFB) rules in stabilizing variability in output and inflation. Our
findings suggest that a simple IFB rule that does not rely upon any direct estimates of the
equilibrium real interest rate and places a relatively high weight on the inflation forecast may
perform better in small open economies than conventional Taylor rules.
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Generations of policymakers have long emphasized an Õimpossible trinityÔ of policy objec-
tives. Attempts to simultaneously maintain ßxed exchange rates, perfect capital mobility,
and independent monetary policy are bound to end either with a whimper or a bang. Over
the 1990s, the intellectual underpinnings of the monetary frameworks adopted by central
banks around the world have assigned increasing emphasis to a rather diÞerent trinity, one
that is Õboth feasible and desirableÔ in the words of John Taylor (2000): this is the trinity
of àexible exchange rates, an inàation target, and a monetary policy rule.
The idea that policy rules originally designed to ßt the specißc economic and institu-
tional features of large and relatively closed economies may be successfully imported by
small, trade-dependent countries is nowadays taken for granted. The key open question is
what kind of modißcations are needed to ßt the complex reality of monetary policymaking
in economies with less developed ßnancial markets, more vulnerability to external sources
of uncertainty, strong movements in productivity and relative prices, and destabilizing ex-
posure to volatile capital àows.
With respect to Taylor-style interest rate rules, a frequently asked question is whether the
size of the response of the instrument to inàation and output gap changes systematically with
the degree of openness and the size of the country. Another recurrent theme in the literature
is what role, if any, should be played by interest rate inertia.1 Finally, a controversial point
concerns the desirability of exchange rate targets in monetary rules.2
This paper contributes to this debate in a number of respects. First, we set up a stochas-
tic dynamic general equilibrium model (SDGE) of suácient complexity to provide a satisfac-
1See e.g. Woodford (1999).
2As the focus of the paper is on the Õfeasible and desirableÔ trinity mentioned above, we abstract from
the issues underlying the choice of a ßxed versus àexible exchange rate regime. For a recent analysis of these
issues in the context of a similar theoretical apparatus see Ghironi and Rebucci (2002) and its references.
1tory representation of trade and macroeconomic interdependencies between a large indus-
trialized country and a small open economy. Next, we calibrate the model with particular
attention to its ability to simulate realistic dynamic responses of relevant macroeconomic
variables to a variety of shocks. Specißcally, we show that the model is able to repli-
cate closely the empirical properties of the monetary transmission mechanism, as estimated
by central banks using institution-specißc tools for policy evaluation. Finally, we com-
pare the performance of alternative interest rate rules Ü Generalized Taylor rules versus
Inàation-Forecast-Based ones Ü in stabilizing variability in inàation and output across the
two economies of the model.
A few caveats should be immediately emphasized. The main focus of our contribution is
to examine and contrast the implications of alternative monetary rules in economies that dif-
fer substantially in their size and degree of openness. From this vantage point, our analysis
is broadly applicable to small, open economies regardless of their degree of industrialization
and development. The specißc reference to emerging economies is perhaps more controver-
sial. Needless to say, the term ÕemergingÔ market applies to a highly heterogeneous array of
institutional and economic realities, and any unqualißed search for common policy prescrip-
tions has a very good chance of being dismissed as quixotic from its very onset. In fact, in
this paper we deliberately abstract from some considerations that would appear germane in
setting monetary policy in many emerging economies, including central bank independence,
potential ßscal constraints, credibility and time-consistency problems in adhering to rules,
liquidity constraints on household or ßrm borrowing, and balance sheet eÞects of exchange
rate àuctuations.
Nevertheless, most so-called ÕemergingÔ markets share a number of features that we
believe our framework is ßt to capture well. Emerging economies according to our charac-
terization are suáciently diversißed and not exclusively dependent on exports of primary
commodities and raw materials. Their securities markets are suáciently developed to allow
2for a meaningful comparison of their macroeconomic properties with the ones observed in
advanced industrialized countries. At the same time, their reliance on trade makes them
more exposed to external àuctuations than their advanced counterparts. Also, they are
intrinsically more vulnerable to a variety of shocks, both on the demand and the supply
side, than their advanced counterparts.
To provide a specißc example, in our simulation exercise we identify the large coun-
try with the Euro area and the small economy with the Czech Republic, a representative
transition country in Central Europe that ßts our deßnition of an emerging economy.3 In
the light of the considerations above, by no means should our results be generalized to the
vast majority of emerging markets without controlling for country-specißc and institutional
factors. Yet, our ßndings are meant to provide a benchmark for the analysis of monetary
rules across heterogeneous economies, over which further research is expected to take oÞ.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our two-country model. Section 3
discusses the calibration of the model to stylized facts for transition economies and the Euro
area. Section 4 employs the model to investigate the potential role of Taylor and Inàation-
Forecast-Based rules for stabilizing output and inàation in both large and small economies.
Finally, Section 5 presents our main conclusions and outlines directions for future work.
3Since our objective is to build a logically consistent two-country framework to study the implications
of strong trade linkages between small and large economies, it is important to state at the outset that
the calibration exercise is not meant to represent a complete model of either the Euro area or the Czech
Republic. Because the calibration only models trade àows between the Czech Republic and the Euro area,
we signißcantly underestimate the absolute degree of openness of both economies. Also, the addition of
a Õrest-of-worldÔ block to the model may be helpful to study issues such as the perspective accession of
Central European countries into the European Union and their transition toward full EMU membership.




The theoretical framework we adopt in our analysis is a variant of the ÕGlobal Economy
ModelÔ (GEM), the new multi-country simulation model currently under development at
the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund.4 The basic structure of the
model is outlined in this section and illustrated in Figure 1.
The world economy consists of two countries, Home (small) and Foreign (large). Foreign
variables are indexed with a star. In each country there are households, ßrms, and a
government.
Each household is inßnitely lived. Each household consumes a single nontradable ßnal
good (A). Each household is the monopolistic supplier of a diÞerentiated labor input (`) to
all domestic ßrms. Wage contracts are subject to adjustment costs (nominal wage rigidities).
Households own domestic ßrms, non-reproducible resources (land L), and the domestic
capital stock (K), which they rent to domestic ßrms. The markets for land and capital are
competitive. Capital accumulation is subject to adjustment costs. Labor, capital and land
are immobile internationally. Households trade a short-term nominal bond, denominated
in Foreign currency, and issued in zero net supply worldwide. There are intermediation
costs for Home households entering the international bond market. No other asset is traded
internationally.
Firms produce the ßnal good, a continuum of diÞerentiated nontradable intermediate
4GEM provides an extension of the stylized models considered in the ÕNew Open-Economy Macroeco-
nomicsÔ theoretical literature such as Obstfeld and RogoÞ (1995, 2000), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a,b),
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), Tille (2001), Devereux and Engel (2001), Corsetti and Dedola (2002),
Benigno and Benigno (2003), and builds on empirical SDGE open-economy applications such as Kollmann
(2001), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), Smets and Wouters (2002a), Batini, Harrison and Millard
(2001), Benigno and Thoenissen (2002), Gali and Monacelli (2002). For a detailed presentation of GEM see
Pesenti (2003).
4goods (N), a continuum of diÞerentiated tradable intermediate goods (T), raw and semi-
ßnished materials (TO), and provide distribution and other intermediation services.
In each country, the ßnal good is produced by perfectly competitive ßrms that use
all intermediate goods (domestic nontradable goods, NN, domestic tradable goods, Q, or
imports, M) as inputs. The ßnal good can be consumed (by domestic households, C, or by
the government, GA) or used for investment (I).
Each intermediate good is produced by a single ßrm under conditions of monopolistic
competition. Each intermediate good is produced by using domestic labor inputs, domestic
capital, and a combination (O) of raw and semi-ßnished materials, both produced domesti-
cally (QO) and imported (M0). The nontradable intermediate goods can be purchased by
the government (GN), used directly in the production of the nontradable ßnal good (NN),
or used in the distribution sector to make tradable intermediate goods available to ßrms
producing the ßnal good. Prices of intermediate goods are subject to adjustment costs
(nominal price rigidities).
Firms in the distribution sector operate under perfect competition. They purchase trad-
able intermediate goods worldwide (at the producer price) and distribute them to ßrms
producing the ßnal good (at the consumer price). Local nontradable goods are the only in-
put in the provision of distribution services. Firms produce tradable raw and semi-ßnished
materials (TO) using labor, capital, and land. The market for raw materials is competitive.
Prices of raw materials are àexible and the law of one price holds internationally.
Government spending falls exclusively on nontradable goods, both ßnal and intermediate.
Government spending is ßnanced through tax and seigniorage revenues. The government
controls the national short-term nominal interest rate. Monetary policy is specißed in terms
of interest rate rules.
52.2 Final goods production
There is a continuum of symmetric Home ßrms producing the Home ßnal good. Each ßrm is
indexed by x 2 [0;s], where 0 < s < 1 is a measure of country size. World size is normalized
to 1, and Foreign ßrms producing the Foreign ßnal good are indexed by x£ 2 (s;1].
Home ßrm x's output at time (quarter) t is denoted At(x).5 The ßnal good is produced




























Three intermediate inputs are used in the production of the ßnal good: a basket NN of
Home nontradable goods, a basket Q of Home tradable goods, and a basket M of imported
Foreign tradable goods. " > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between tradable goods and
nontradable goods, and "QM > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
imported inputs. The (log of) tradable goods weight ­t is subject to an auto-correlated
disturbance term around a steady-state mean.6 These shocks are isomorphic to shifts in
Home residents' preferences from tradable goods to nontradable goods.
To model realistic dynamics of imports volumes (such as sluggish adjustment to changes
in relative prices) we assume that it is costly to change the share of the imported goods in













5The convention throughout the model is that variables which are not explicitly indexed (to ßrms or
households) are expressed in per-capita (average) terms. For instance, At ± (1=s)
R s
0 At(x)dx.
6See Table 2 for a description of the assumptions about the shocks.
7A similar specißcation appears e.g. in Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2002). For analytical simplicity we
assume that a ßrm ßnds it costly to adjust its current imports/output ratio Mt(x)=At(x) relatively to the
past aggregate imports/output ratio Mt 1=At 1.
6Like all other adjustment costs in the model, they are treated as local services provided at
zero cost: all revenue from adjustment is rebated in a lump-sum fashion to the country's
residents.
The basket NN is a CES index of diÞerentiated Home intermediate nontradable goods,
deßned over a continuum of mass s. Each good is produced by a single Home ßrm indexed
by n 2 [0;s]. Deßning as NN (n;x) the demand by ßrm x of an intermediate good produced














where ² > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution among intermediate nontradable goods.
Similarly, the baskets Q and M are CES indexes of diÞerentiated intermediate tradable
goods, respectively produced in the Home country and imported from the Foreign country.
Each good is produced by a single ßrm. Home ßrms in the tradable goods sector are indexed



























The cost-minimization problem of Home ßrm x can be split in two parts. First, each
ßrm takes as given the prices of the nontradable diÞerentiated goods p(n) and minimizes
R s
0 pt (n)NN;t (n;x)dn subject to (3). The cost-minimizing price of one unit of the nontrad-












Similarly, we can derive the cost-minimizing prices of the baskets of intermediate goods Q
and M, respectively PQ and PM. Next, each Home ßrm takes the prices of the intermediate
baskets PQ, PM and PN as given and minimizes PQ;tQt(x) + PM;tMt(x) + PN;tNN;t(x)
subject to (1). As the ßnal good sector is perfectly competitive, each ßrm x takes the price
7of the ßnal good P as given and equates its marginal cost to the price. Foreign variables
are similarly deßned.
2.3 Demand for intermediate goods and the distribution sector


































Similar considerations hold for MD
t (x), the demand of Foreign tradable intermediate goods
f.
To derive the demand schedule for nontradable intermediate goods, we need to take into
account the diÞerent uses of the n inputs in the Home economy. First, as we have seen,
nontradable goods enter directly in the production function of ßnal goods through the basket
NN. Second, nontradable goods can be consumed by the government. Third, nontradable
goods are used in the distribution sector according to the following assumptions.
Firms producing the ßnal good cannot purchase the intermediate tradable goods directly
from the producers. Instead, ßrms in the distribution sector purchase tradable goods both
domestically and abroad and distribute them to the ßrms producing the ßnal good. The
distribution technology is Leontief: to make one unit of an intermediate good available to
downstream producers, ßrms in the distribution sector require ± µ 0 units of the nontradable
goods basket N. There are no distribution costs for nontradable goods.8
Firms in the distribution sector are perfectly competitive. Because of distribution costs,
there is a wedge between producer (wholesale) and consumer (retail) prices. We denote
8The specißcation of the distribution sector builds on Corsetti and Dedola (2002). See also Erceg and
Levin (1996) and Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003).
8with p the consumer price (that is, the price paid by Home ßrms producing the ßnal good)
and with é p the Home-currency producer price (that is, the price paid by Home ßrms in the
distribution sector) of an intermediate good. It follows that:
pt(n) = é pt(n); pt(h) = é pt(h) + ±PN;t; pt(f) = é pt(f) + ±PN;t (9)
Denoting government spending on nontradable goods by GN;t, we can now derive the















[NN;t + ± (Qt + Mt) + GN;t] (10)
Foreign variables are similarly characterized.
2.4 Supply of intermediate goods
In this section we focus on the supply of Home nontradable goods, with the understanding
that the derivation of the other intermediate goods at Home and abroad follows similar
steps.
Nontradable goods n are produced by symmetric ßrms using the following CES technol-
ogy:
NS
t (n) = ZN;t
º



















Firms use labor `(n), capital K(n) and a basket O(n) of two tradable inputs (raw materials)
produced in the Home and in the Foreign country respectively. ¸N > 0 is the constant
elasticity of input substitution, and ZN is a stochastic process for productivity common to
all producers of nontradable goods. Changes in O(n) are subject to adjustment costs ÈO
similar to equation (2) above.
9DiÞerentiated labor inputs in both countries are deßned over a continuum of mass equal
to the country size: Home labor inputs are indexed by j 2 [0;s], Foreign labor inputs by














where `(n;j) is the demand of type-j labor by the producer of good n and ¾ > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution among labor inputs.








"ON + (1   ·N)
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where QO(n) denotes Home ßrm n's use of domestic raw materials and MO(n) denotes ßrm
n's imports of raw materials from Foreign. Home and Foreign materials are combined with
elasticity of substitution "ON > 0. Once again, imports MO(n) are subject to adjustment
costs ÈMO(n).
Firms producing intermediate goods take the prices of labor inputs, capital and raw
materials as given. Cost-minimization in the intermediate sector implies that the demand























Denoting by R the Home nominal rental price of capital, by PQO the Home-currency
price of one unit of QO and by PMO the Home-currency price of one unit of MO, ßrms in the
Home nontradable goods sector minimize their costs Wt`t(n) + RtKt(n) + PQO;tQO;t(n) +





O;t(n) and the marginal cost MC(n).
10Similar considerations hold for the production of Home tradable goods. We denote by
TS(h) the supply of each Home-country intermediate tradable h. Using self-explanatory
notation, we have:
TS
t (h) = ZT;t
º



















Following the same steps as above it is possible to derive input demands and marginal costs
in the tradable goods sector. We proceed analogously in the case of Foreign nontradable
goods n£ and Foreign tradable goods f.
2.5 Price setting in the intermediate sector
Consider now proßt maximization in the Home country's intermediate nontradable goods
sector. Each ßrm n takes into account the demand (10) for its product and sets the nominal
price pt(n) by maximizing the present discounted value of real proßts. There is sluggish
price adjustment due to resource costs measured in terms of total proßts. The adjustment










where ¾N µ 0. This specißcation builds on Rotemberg's (1982) quadratic cost of price
adjustment. Drawing from Ireland (2001), the adjustment cost is related to changes in ßrm
n's price inàation relative to the past observed inàation rate in the nontradable goods sector
as a whole. This allows the model to reproduce realistic inàation dynamics encompassing
nominal inertias and staggering.9
9A variant of the model adds another quadratic term to the adjustment cost, penalizing changes of the
nominal price pt(n)=pt 1(n) relative to a parameter ¹, which is equal to the gross steady-state rate of
inàation ¹ > 0.








Dt;¼ (p¼(n)   MC¼(n))p¼(n) ² (PN;¼)
²
£(NN;¼ + ± (Q¼ + M¼) + GN;¼)(1   ÈPN;¼(n))g (18)
where the discount rate Dt;¼ (with Dt;t = 1) is the intertemporal marginal rate of sub-
stitution in consumption of the representative household, to be deßned below. Note that






where the ßxed gross markup ²=(²   1) is a negative function of the elasticity of input
substitution.
Consider now the price-setting problem in the Home tradable goods sector. Each ßrm h
has to set two (wholesale) prices, é p(h) in the Home market and é p£(h) in the Foreign market.
Denoting the nominal exchange rate as E (deßned as Home currency per unit of Foreign










(é p¼(h)   MC¼(h))
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é p¼(h) + ±PN;¼
PQ;¼
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where the costs ÈPQ;t(h) and È£
PM;t(h) are the analogs of (17).
If nominal rigidities in the export market are highly relevant, the prices of Home goods in
the Foreign market will be characterized by signißcant inertia.10 In this case, exchange rate
pass-through in the Foreign economy will be rather low due to the fact that prices are sticky
in the consumer currency, that is, exports are invoiced in Foreign currency. However, it is
worth emphasizing that in our model exchange rate pass-through may be low for reasons
unrelated to nominal rigidities.
10Substantially, this is the Õlocal currency pricingÔ scenario analyzed by Devereux and Engel (2000),
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a) and others.

















The presence of distribution services intensive in local inputs implies that the elasticity of
demand for any brand is not necessarily the same across markets. As a result, ßrm h will
in general charge diÞerent prices at Home and abroad. As stressed by Corsetti and Dedola
(2002), exchange rate pass-through is less than perfect (that is, @ log é p£
t(h)=@ logEt < 1) and
the law of one price does not hold (that is, é pt(h) 6= Eté p£
t(h)) even if wholesale prices are fully
àexible. Asymmetries in relative productivity, relative wages, or relative costs of capital
drive a wedge between Home and Foreign prices of a good h. Markups in both markets
are state-contingent and vary as functions of productivity and demand shocks.11 Foreign
variables are similarly characterized.
2.6 Tradable inputs
In this section, we model tradable upstream inputs used up in the production of downstream
intermediate goods. These inputs can be thought of as raw and semi-ßnished materials or
parts. It is assumed that market power in these sectors is negligible, and there is no price
discrimination across countries.
Notational conventions and modeling strategy are very similar to the ones adopted above.
Symmetric Home ßrms producing raw materials are indexed by o 2 [0;s]. Raw materials






















where ZO is a productivity disturbance term.
11Similar considerations apply to the retail (consumer) market.
13Firm o takes all prices as given, including the price of land PL, and minimizes Wt`t(o)+
RtKt(o) + PL;tLt(o) subject to (22), obtaining expressions for `D
t (o), KD
t (o), and LD
t (o).
The Home price of Home raw materials, PQO, is equal to ßrm o's marginal cost:
PQO;t =
h











and, in the absence of pricing to market, the law of one price holds:
P£
MO;t = PQO;t=Et (24)
Similar considerations hold in the Foreign country.
2.7 Household optimization
In each country there is a continuum of symmetric households. Home households are indexed
by j 2 [0;s] and Foreign households by j£ 2 (s;1], the same indexes of labor inputs.
Households' preferences are additively separable in consumption and labor eÞort. De-





¼ t [U (C¼ (j))   V (`¼(j))] (25)







where Ct 1 is past per-capita Home consumption and 0 < b < 1. The term ZU is a





where ° > 0 and ZV;t is a shock to labor disutility. Foreign agent j£'s preferences are
similarly specißed. The discount rate ¬ is assumed to be identical across countries.
14The individual àow budget constraint for agent j in the Home country is:
Mt(j) + EtB£
t+1(j) + Bt+1(j) ´ Mt 1(j) + (1 + i£
t)[1   ÈB;t]EtB£
t (j)
+(1 + it)Bt(j) + RtKt(j) + PL;tLt(j) + Wt(j)`t(j)[1   ÈW;t(j)]
 PtCt(j)[1 + ÈS;t(j)]   PtIt(j) + Ðt   NETTt(j) (28)
Home agents hold domestic money M and two bonds, B and B£, denominated in Home
and Foreign currency, respectively. The short-term nominal rates it and i£
t are paid at
the beginning of period t and are known at time t   1.12 The two short-term rates are
directly controlled by the national governments. Only the Foreign-currency bond is traded
internationally: the Foreign bond is in zero net supply worldwide, while the Home bond is
in zero net supply at the domestic level.
The ßnancial friction ÈB is introduced to guarantee that net asset positions follow a
stationary process and the economies converge asymptotically to a steady state.13 Home
agents face a transaction cost ÈB when they take a position in the Foreign bond market.
This cost depends on the average net asset position of the whole economy and is zero only
















with 0 ´ ¾B1 ´ 1, ¾B2 > 0 and B£
H ± (1=s)
R s
0 B£(j)dj, representing per-capita Home
holdings of the Foreign bond.
When B£
H is zero, ÈB = 0. When Home is a net lender and holdings of the Foreign bond
go to inßnity, ÈB rises from zero to ¾B1, implying that Home households lose an increasing
12We adopt the notation of Obstfeld and RogoÞ (1996, ch.10). Specißcally, our timing convention has
Bt(j) and B£
t (j) as agent j's nominal bonds accumulated during period t 1 and carried over into period t.
13A similar modeling strategy is adopted by Benigno (2001). Alternative approaches to guarantee sta-
tionarity rely on parametric assumptions as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) or demographic dynamics as in
Ghironi and Rebucci (2002).
15fraction of their Foreign bond returns to ßnancial intermediaries.14 Similarly, when Home is
a net borrower and holdings of the Foreign bond go to minus inßnity, ÈB falls from zero to
 ¾B1 implying that Home households pay an increasing intermediation premium on their
debt. This guarantees that in a non-stochastic steady state Home agents have no incentive to
hold Foreign bonds and net asset positions are zero worldwide. The parameter ¾B2 controls
the àatness of the ÈB function, hence the speed of convergence to the steady state. The
variable ZB;t is a noise term: uncertainty in international ßnancial intermediation plays in
GEM the same role that Õuncovered interest parity shocksÔ or risk-premium àuctuations
play in other open-economy models (such as McCallum and Nelson (1999) or Kollmann
(2001)).
Home agents rent land to Home ßrms at the nominal rate PL and accumulate Home
physical capital which they rent to Home ßrms at the nominal rate R. The supply of land
is exogenous, say Lt(j) = Lt(j). The law of motion of capital is:
Kt+1(j) = (1   ®)Kt(j) + ÑtKt(j) 0 < ® ´ 1 (30)
where ® is the depreciation rate. To simulate realistic investment àows, capital accumulation























where ¾I1;¾I2 µ 0 and ZI;t is a temporary shock (an unexpected increase in ZI;t is equivalent
to an increase in the rate of capital depreciation that raises investment relative to baseline).
Each household is the monopolistic supplier of a labor input j. Using (14) and its


















14It is assumed that all intermediation ßrms are owned by Home residents, and that their revenue is
rebated to Home households in a lump-sum fashion.
16where `t is per-capita total labor in the Home economy. Each household sets the nominal
wage for input type j accounting for (32). Following Kim (2000), there is sluggish wage
adjustment due to resource costs that are measured in terms of the total wage bill. The










where ¾W µ 0. As was the case for prices above, wage adjustment costs are related to
changes in wage inàation relative to the past observed rate for the whole economy.
Consumption spending is subject to a proportional transaction cost ÈS that depends on
the household's money velocity v, where vt(j) ± PtCt(j)=Mt(j): Agents choose their stock
of real money holdings M=P optimally, so that at the margin shopping costs measured
in terms of foregone consumption are equal to the beneßts from investing in yield-bearing
assets.15
Home agents own all Home ßrms and there is no international trade in claims on ßrms'
proßts. The variable Ð includes all proßts accruing to Home households, plus all Home-
currency revenue from nominal and real adjustment rebated in a lump-sum way to all Home
households, plus revenue from ßnancial intermediation, which is assumed to be provided by
Home ßrms exclusively.
Finally, Home agents pay lump-sum (non-distortionary) net taxes NETTt(j) denomi-
nated in Home currency. Similar relations hold in the Foreign country, with the exception
of the intermediation frictions in the ßnancial market.
The representative Home household chooses bond and money holdings, capital and con-
sumption paths, and sets wages to maximize its expected lifetime utility (25) subject to (28)
15Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), the particular functional form for the transaction cost is:















1 + ÈS;¼ + È0
S;¼v¼
i; (34)
which is Home agents' stochastic discount rate and the Home pricing kernel, the ßrst-order
conditions with respect to Bt+1(j) and B£
t+1(j) are, respectively:












The above expression is the risk-adjusted uncovered interest parity equilibrium, accounting
for the fact that the return on lending to Foreign is reduced (and the cost of borrowing from
Foreign is increased) by the costs of intermediation ÈB.16 In a non-stochastic steady state,
the interest diÞerential (1 + i)=(1 + i£) is equal to the steady-state nominal depreciation
rate of the Home currency, and 1+i = ¹=¬, where ¹ is the gross steady-state inàation rate
and 1=¬ is the steady-state gross real rate of interest (equal to the rate of time preference).
The ßrst-order conditions with respect to Mt(j), Kt+1(j) and Wt(j) are standard. Real
money balances M=P are a positive function of consumption and a negative function of the
nominal interest rate. Capital accumulation is linked to the behavior of the real price of
capital R=P. In steady state, 1 + R=P is equal to the sum of the rate of time preference,
1=¬, and the rate of capital depreciation, ®. Also, in steady state the real wage W=P is equal
to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, V 0=U0, augmented
by the markup ¾=(¾   1) which reàects monopoly power in the labor market.
Optimization implies that households exhaust their intertemporal budget constraint: the
àow budget constraint (28) hold as equality and the transversality condition is satisßed:
lim
¼!1
EtDt;¼ [M¼ 1(j) + (1 + i¼)B¼(j) + (1 + i£
¼)(1   ÈB;¼)E¼B£
¼(j)] = 0 (36)
Similar results characterize the optimization problem of Foreign agent j£.
16Note that ZB;t is known at time t, the same time period when the governments set the nominal rates
it+1 and i£




Public spending falls on nontradable goods, both ßnal and intermediate. In the model, GA is
per-capita public purchases of Home ßnal goods (a random variable in our simulation), and
GN is per-capita public purchases of Home intermediate nontradable goods. Governments
ßnance public expenditure through net lump-sum taxes and seigniorage revenue. The budget
constraint of the Home government is:






[Mt(j)   Mt 1(j)]dj (37)
The government controls the short-term rate it+1. Monetary policy is specißed in terms
of annualized interest rate rules of the form:
(1 + it+1)


















where the left-hand side is the annualized interest rate, it is the lagged interest rate (with 0 <






In the expression above, Pt+¼=Pt+¼ 4 is the year-on-year gross CPI inàation rate ¼ quarters
into the future, and Ít+¼ is the year-on-year gross inàation target ¼ quarters into the future.
The term Ê is a function of a set zt of observable variables (output gap, exchange rate,
etc.) expressed as deviations from their targets, determining feedback rules for the nominal
interest rate.17
Foreign variables are similarly characterized. Any steady-state discrepancy between i and
i£ (thus, between ¹ and ¹£) determines the steady-state rate of exchange rate depreciation
(for ¹ > ¹£) or appreciation (for ¹ < ¹£).







The model is closed by imposing the following resource constraints and market clearing


























N;t (n;x)dx + ± (Qt + Mt) + GN;t (40)





































































t (j£)dj£ = 0: (46)
By aggregating the budget constraints across private and public agents we derive expressions
for the nominal current account and gross national product.18
18In the simulation exercises, our measure of real (constant-dollar) GDP is obtained by evaluating expen-
ditures using ßxed (steady-state) relative prices.
203 Solution, calibration and model properties
3.1 Solution methods
To solve the model we ßrst rely upon Newton-based techniques to obtain the steady-state
solution of the nonlinear model. The model is then linearized and we use the standard tools
that have been developed in DYNARE to study the properties of linear SDGE models.19
The particular technique used to evaluate the steady-state solution is a DAC (Divide-And-
Conquer) algorithm. The basic strategy behind DAC algorithms is to solve complex nonlin-
ear problems by breaking them down into a series of less complicated problems. The DAC
algorithm exploits the robustness and eáciency properties of Newton-based algorithms and
has been designed explicitly to deal with large models like GEM in which important non-
linearities arise directly from the model's theoretical structure.20 The DAC algorithm is
used extensively to calibrate the initial steady-state baseline solution as well as to study the
nonlinear model's properties in response to permanent shocks.21
The steady-state solution strategy with the DAC algorithm involves two steps. First,
we start with a parameterization of the model that guarantees an ÕeasyÔ solution with
a Newton-based algorithm. This will be the case when the model is approximately lin-
ear.22 Second, after obtaining an initial set of values for the endogenous variables, we then
19The DYNARE toolbox derives the reduced-form representation of the model and then provides stan-
dard moments based on assumptions about the stochastic forcing processes. In addition, it automatically
provides stability and eigenvalue analysis, plots impulse response functions, and computes the contribution
of variability in the stochastic forcing processes to each endogenous variable.
20For more details on the tools that have been developed to study SDGE models and how we obtain the
steady-state solution of the model see Juillard and Laxton (2003).
21The permanent disinàation shocks reported below were derived using a Newton-based perfect-foresight
simulation algorithm available in portable TROLL. For the properties of these algorithms see Armstrong et
al. (1998) and Juillard et al. (1998).
22If the model is exactly linear, Newton's method is guaranteed to ßnd the solution in one iteration if a
21gradually adjust the parameters and exogenous variables towards their desired values in
suáciently small steps that allow Newton's method to ßnd solutions extremely rapidly.23
3.2 Estimates of macroeconomic variability and calibration of the
stochastic processes
While the model introduced in the previous section shares many characteristics with other
recent SDGE models, it also exhibits a number of relatively novel features (such as the
two-stage trade structure, the inclusion of nontradable goods, the presence of a distribution
sector) not unique to the model but still non-standard in the literature,24 and encompasses
a large number of sources of uncertainty. These features provide greater àexibility to ßt the
data and simulate realistic interdependencies between a small ÕrepresentativeÔ transition
country (the ÕHomeÔ country of our quarterly model) and the block of Euro countries (the
ÕForeignÔ country), as we discuss in what follows.
Table 1 provides some estimates of macroeconomic variability based on standard devia-
tions of detrended data for both the Euro area and the Czech Republic.25 As shown in the
table, real GDP has been about twice as volatile in the Czech Republic as it has been in
the Euro area. Table 1 also includes estimates of variability for consumption, investment,
government absorption, exports and imports. For the Euro area these measures suggest
solution exists. If the model is approximately linear, Newton's method will ßnd the true solution in a few
iterations provided the user has provided reasonable initial guesses for the endogenous variables.
23While Newton's method is not foolproof and does require some understanding of both the algorithm
and the model that is being studied, we have found that in practise it works extremely well for building
large nonlinear SDGE models like GEM.
24It is worth noticing that most models of this genre have a single productive sector.
25With the exception of the measures of inàation, interest rates and the ratios of net exports to GDP,
all of the measures in Table 1 have been detrended with the HP ßlter using a smoothness parameter of
1600. The measures for the Euro are based on data from 1970Q1 to 2001Q4 and the measures for the Czech
Republic are based on data from 1973Q1 to 2002Q4.
22that imports are the most volatile component of real GDP expenditures (with a standard
deviation of 3.1 percent), followed by investment (2.7) and exports (2.4). The data also
indicate that, over the long sample period covered in our analysis, detrended consumption
expenditures and government absorption have displayed less variability than real GDP.26
The measures for the Czech Republic tell a diÞerent story as regards the degree of vari-
ability in the transition countries. Indeed, since 1993 all expenditure components Ü includ-
ing consumption and government absorption Ü have been signißcantly more volatile than
aggregate real GDP. Also, àuctuations of investment relative to GDP have been signißcantly
wider in transition countries: investment has been 3.5 times more volatile than real GDP in
the Czech Republic compared to 2.7 times in the Euro area. Data for Hungary and Poland
present a similar pattern and suggest similar considerations about the nature of shocks to
these economies. All three transition countries have experienced increases of real investment
around 10-15 percentage points of GDP since 1993, and the current investment/GDP ratios
are well above the aggregate ratio in the Euro area.
Measures of variability in interest rates and exchange rates are also included in Table
1. Variability in nominal interest rates has been quite high in these countries, mainly
reàecting the process of disinàation. The real eÞective exchange rate has approximately the
same degree of variability as the nominal eÞective exchange rate, a feature shared by many
other emerging and advanced economies. A fairly strong link between productivity and
the real exchange rate provides evidence in support of the Balassa-Samuleson hypothesis,27
26This feature of lower variability in consumption expenditures in advanced economies such as the Euro
area is not robust to the sample period chosen. For example, over the 1990s several industrial countries
have recorded greater variability in consumption expenditures than in their real GDP measures.
27For instance, Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) provide econometric evidence of a Balassa-Samuelson eÞect
in Eastern and European countries, according to which strong productivity growth in the tradables sector
results in higher real wages in both the tradables and nontradables sectors, a trend increase in the price
of nontradables relative to tradables, and a strong upward trend in CPI-based real exchange rates. The
original contributions are Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964).
23although other driving factors, such as a shift in tastes in more advanced economies towards
the types of goods produced by transition countries, may have played a key role in aÞecting
real exchange rate movements.28
A key stylized fact for the transition countries has been the enormous increase in the
degree of openness over the time period covered by Table 1, with both the export and import
ratios rising between 20 and 30 percentage points. The strong correlation between exports
and imports in the transition countries reàects several factors: higher investment in the
tradable goods sectors, as well as the eÞects of structural reforms and a production shift
toward higher-quality goods in demand from more advanced economies; the intensive use
of imported intermediate inputs in the production of tradable goods, as well as constraints
(capital controls) that may have limited the magnitude of current account imbalances in
these countries. The two-stage trade structure of our model helps rationalize these elements.
In the light of the above considerations, the model encompasses several types of stochastic
shocks in both countries, as well as a Õrisk premiumÔ shock ZB. The assumptions about the
shocks are reported in Table 2. These include shocks to productivity in all the sectors (ZT,
ZN, ZO) as well as shocks to aggregate investment (the depreciation rate ZI), consumption
(the marginal utility of consumption ZU), labor eÞort (the marginal disutility of labor eÞort
ZV ), government spending (GA) and a preference shifter that aÞects the weight of tradable
goods in ßnal good production (­). The productivity shocks are perfectly correlated in all
sectors in each country. The distributions of the shocks have been calibrated to match some
of the moments reported in Table 1. For example, based on these assumptions the model
generates about twice as much variability in GDP in the Czech Republic than in the Euro
Area, and the absolute degrees of variability in GDP are consistent with our measures of
variability in the historical data. However, there are several important diÞerences between
28Lipschitz, Lane and Mourmouras (2002) suggest that the real exchange rate may have been very low
at the start of the transition because of insuácient market penetration and product reputation in Western
markets.
24the model's estimates of variability and the historical measures provided in Table 1.
Relative to the historical data, the model generates considerably less variability in in-
àation (and interest rates). This is to be expected because a maintained assumption of
the analysis is that monetary policy is being governed by either an explicit (or implicit)
inàation-targeting regime, where interest rates are adjusted to provide an anchor for inàa-
tion expectations. The base-case assumption for the calibration of the model assumes a
Generalized Taylor rule29 with an interest rate smoothing parameter of 0.5 and a weight
on inàation equal to one. As noted above, inàation and interest rate variability is consider-
ably lower than in the historical data because the latter were aÞected by the disinàationary
strategies pursued by the monetary authorities.
Also, the model's measure of the real exchange rate is considerably more volatile than the
historical data for the Czech republic. In fact, monetary policy regimes in place before the
adoption of inàation targeting in May 1997 were designed to explicitly reduce variability in
the exchange rate. The sample period is rather limited, but variability in the detrended real
exchange rate has been signißcantly higher since 1997. In GEM, shocks to the risk premium
induce signißcant variability in the components of aggregate demand and this may explain,
for example, why consumption variability can be signißcantly higher than variability in real
GDP in emerging economies.
3.3 Baseline parameters
We now discuss the key aspects of our base-case calibration. The Home country size s
relative to World is measured in terms of (relative) GDP. We set s at 5 percent. The
discount rate ¬ (the reciprocal of the steady-state real interest rate) is similar in the two
countries. A typical yearly calibration for the real interest rate is 3-4 percent. We follow
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and set ¬ = 1:03 0:25.
29See Section 4 below.
25The elasticities of substitution among diÞerentiated intermediate goods, ² and ²
£, are
evaluated to match existing estimates of steady-state price markups such as ²=(²   1).
Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) estimate the average markup for manufacturing sectors
at around 1.2 in most OECD countries over the period 1980-92. Some authors rely on
lower estimates (for instance Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) choose 1.1), while other
authors30 suggest that a range between 1.2 and 1.7 may be plausible. We set ²=(²   1) = 1:2
or ² = 6 in both countries.
The elasticities of substitution among diÞerentiated labor inputs, ¾ and ¾
£, are related
to the wage markup. According to Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002), values between
1.15 and 1.4 for the sum of the steady-state wage and price markups can be thought of as
Õfalling within a plausible rangeÔ. However, higher values may be appropriate for the euro
area. For instance, Benigno and Thoenissen (2002) estimate ¾ at 5.1 for the UK, and 4.0
for the Euro area. Our parameterization takes ¾ = ¾
£ = 4 in both countries.
The choice of ­;·;·N;·T and their Foreign equivalents highlight the diÞerences in the
degrees of openness among the two economies on which our exercise is focused. We set
­ = :25, ­£ = :50, ·£ = ·£
N = ·£
T = :98, · = ·N = :05, ·T = :02. Our calibration implies
that in the Home country the import share of downstream intermediate goods is equal
to 19.9 percent and the import share of upstream raw materials is equal to 17.4 percent,
roughly equally distributed among tradable and nontradable goods.31
For the Foreign country, we assume that the weight of capital in production is the same in
both sectors that produce intermediate goods for ßnal consumption and set a£
N = «£
T = 0:33.
We assume a relatively higher value for the weight of capital in the Home country based on
estimates provided by the Czech National Bank (aN = «T = 0:40). The weights of raw
materials are ­£
N = ­£
T = 0:3, ­N = 0:1, and ­T = 0:5. The production of raw materials and
30See e.g. Morrison (1994) or Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
31These import shares ßgures are based on recent estimates by the Czech National Bank of the trade
volumes between the Czech Republic and the Euro area.
26semi-ßnished goods is assumed to use a non-reproducible resource (referred to as ÕlandÔ)
in exogenous supply. In both countries the combined income share of capital and land is
assumed to be 0.3, with two-thirds of this income stream accruing to capital and one third
to land («O = «£
O = 0:20 and ­O = ­£
O = 0:10). These parameters values interact with
the import shares and generate steady-state labor shares in total GDP of about 65 percent
both in the Euro area and in the transition country.
The elasticity of substitution between tradable goods and nontradable goods in ßnal
good production " is set at 1.1 in both countries. The elasticity of substitution between
intermediate exportables and importables in the Home country is also set at 1.1, but is
signißcantly higher in the Foreign country, where "£
QM = 4. These choices are broadly in
line with other studies, although the range of plausible options is rather large. Empirical
studies of the price elasticity of import demand such as Hooper and Marquez (1995) report
a median value of 0.6 for Japan, Germany and UK. Gali and Monacelli (2002) choose " = 1
as their baseline. Other studies (including Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), and Smets
and Wouters (2002a)) set the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods at
1.5.
The elasticities of input substitution in the production of intermediate tradable goods
and nontradable goods and raw materials (¸N, ¸T, ¸O) are all set at .75 in both countries,
signißcantly below the customary unit elasticity associated with Cobb-Douglas production
functions. This choice allows us to simulate a lesser response of capital to interest rate
changes than would be the case under a Cobb-Douglas calibration. As opposed to labor
and capital, domestic and imported raw materials are highly substitutable in production.
Correspondingly, we set the elasticities (¸ON, ¸OT) at 3 in both countries.
Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003) highlight the link between ± and the wholesale/retail
margin and set the parameters ± and ±£ equal to 1. However, in our model the whole-
sale/retail margin is a function of other structural parameters such as the demand elas-
27ticities, and the choice of the distribution parameter ± also aÞects the degree of exchange
rate pass-through. Our baseline is ± = :2 in the Home country and ±£ = :35 in the euro
area, implying ceteris paribus a higher degree of pass-through in the emerging economy,
consistent with empirical evidence.32
The parameterization of the marginal utility of consumption relies on a combination
of high habit persistence (b = :95) and high intertemporal substitution (» = 1=3). This
specißcation is unorthodox but certainly not unprecedented: for instance, Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998) adopt » = 0:16 coupled with the assumption that households choose their
index of purchases Ct at time t 2, thus making expenditures decisions predetermined with
respect to the timing of interest rate shocks. Experiments with alternative parameters are
conducted in sensitivity analysis.
The marginal disutility of labor eÞort is V 0 = `°. Micro-data estimates of ° consider
[3;20] as a reasonable range. For instance, Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002) take ° = 5
as their baseline. But other authors, e.g. Kollmann (2001), choose ° = 0 (linear disutility
of labor) following the real business cycle literature. Our benchmark parameterization is
° = 2:5 in both countries.
Aggregate data suggest an annual depreciation rate for capital of about 10 percent, so
® = ®
£ = 0:025. The adjustment cost parameters for capital accumulation, ¾I1 and ¾I2, are
chosen as to match the fact that the standard deviation of investment is typically observed
to be 3-4 times larger than the standard deviation of GDP.
The transaction-cost parameters in the bond market are ¾B1 = 0:05 and ¾B2 = 0:1,
leading to a very slow reversion of the net asset position between Home and Foreign to
its steady-state value. This feature guarantees that in the short and medium term the
properties of the model Ü especially the degree of persistence of bond holdings and the
dynamics of the current account Ü are virtually unaÞected by the asymptotic convergence
32See Campa and Goldberg (2001).
28condition. Money demand plays a residual role in our model. We follow Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2001) and set ¾S1 = 0:011 and ¾S2 = 0:075 in both countries, consistent with their
estimates of money demand in the US.
As ratios of steady-state GDP, government spending GN is set at 10 percent and GA is
set at 5 percent in the two countries, broadly in line with the observed shares of government
consumption (assumed to fall exclusively on intermediate nontradable goods) and investment
(assumed to have the same composition of private investment).
The base-case calibration of the model assumes a signißcant degree of structural inàa-
tion persistence in wages and prices of the intermediate goods in both the tradable goods
and nontradable goods sectors (controlled by ¾N, ¾T, ¾W and their Foreign analogs). The
adjustment cost parameters that determine the degree of structural inàation persistence
were calibrated to be consistent with a sacrißce ratio of 2.1 in the Foreign country and 1.1
in the Home country.33 This assumption implies values for ¾N;¾T;¾W around 400 in the
Home country and twice this magnitude for the Foreign country. In addition, the base-case
calibration of the model assumes that export prices respond instantaneously to changes in
exchange rates (¾M = ¾
£
M = 0): as discussed above, because of the presence of a distri-
bution sector there will be incomplete pass-through of the exchange rate to the prices of
intermediate goods even when export prices are fully àexible. Yet, in sensitivity analysis
we consider the eÞects of lowering short-run pass-though by increasing the adjustment costs
for export prices ¾M and ¾
£
M.
33The sacrißce ratio is deßned as the cumulative annual output gap that is required to permanently reduce
inàation by one percentage point. Estimates of sacrißce ratios are typically smaller in emerging market
economies than in relatively closed economies like the Euro area. The estimate of a 1.1 sacrißce ratio for the
Home country was based on the results of a simulation conducted at the Czech National Bank, suggesting
that this is a plausible estimate of the transitory output costs of disinàation. A sacrißce ratio around 2.0
for the Foreign country is well within the range of estimates produced by other models of the Euro area.
293.4 Simulating the monetary transmission mechanism
As mentioned earlier, our model has been calibrated to mimic closely the empirical features
of the monetary transmission mechanism as estimated and relied upon for forecasting and
policy analysis by central banks. In most empirical models of the monetary transmission
mechanism, it is not possible for the monetary authority to change the target rate of inàation
without having signißcant short-run eÞects on real variables in the economy. In addition,
in the same empirically-based estimates of the monetary transmission mechanism, hikes in
interest rates do not usually result in instantaneous jumps in real activity, but require several
quarters to work their eÞects through the economy. Similar features, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, appear in our simulations.
To illustrate diÞerences and similarities between the two economies of our model, in
this section we study the dynamic adjustment patterns in response to two types of policy
shocks: a permanent one-percentage point disinàation shock, and a 100 basis point hike in
the short-term policy rate.
3.4.1 Permanent reduction in the target rate of inàation
Figure 2 reports the results of an experiment where the inàation target in the Foreign country
is reduced permanently by 1 percentage point. In each panel, the solid line refers to the
Home country and the dashed line refers to the Foreign country. As can be seen in the two
top panels of Figure 2, the presence of stickiness in the inàation process requires an increase
in the nominal interest rate and leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This
results in a hump-shaped proßle for real GDP that troughs after about four quarters, when
monetary conditions ease to prevent an undershooting of the new inàation target. Since the
Foreign country's external trade is relatively small (our two-country setup ignores any trade
linkages between the Euro area and the rest of the world outside the emerging country),
the response of real GDP is mainly determined by the response of aggregate consumption
30and investment expenditures. The response of investment to this type of aggregate demand
shock is approximately three times the response of aggregate GDP, whereas consumption
responds slightly less than GDP over the cycle.
The cumulative quarterly eÞect on the output gap in the Foreign country is 8.5, imply-
ing a sacrißce ratio of around 2.1, consistent with a fairly large body of empirical evidence
according to which disinàation results in signißcant output costs in the short run.34 The
appreciation of the real exchange rate in the Foreign country results in a loss in competi-
tiveness and a deterioration in real exports of the Foreign country. Note, that because the
Home country has signißcant trade linkages with the Foreign country, the overall spillover
eÞects are contractionary on both investment and consumption in the Home country.
When conducting the same type of experiment in the Home country, real GDP in the
Home country declines by a similar amount as real GDP in the Foreign country when
the shock originates in the Foreign country, but in this case the cycle is signißcantly less
protracted. Indeed, in this experiment the quarterly output gap of the Home country
cumulates to 4.5 percent, implying a sacrißce ratio of 1.1. As the Home country is small,
the Home shock has no discernible eÞect on the levels of consumption and investment in the
Foreign country.35
Figure 3 compares our results for a disinàation shock in the Home country with the
same experiment conducted on the Czech National Bank's Quarterly Projection Model
(CNB-QPM). In the panels of Figure 3, the solid line refers to the Home country as
considered in GEM, while the dashed line refers now to the Home country as considered
in CNB-QPM.36 To make the results more easily comparable across models, the interest
34Micro-founded models like GEM also feature interesting asymmetries where the temporary output gains
associated with inàating are actually less than the temporary output losses associated with disinàation.
35These results as well as other sensitivity analysis are available upon request from the authors.
36We thank Jan Vlcek and his colleagues at the CNB for supplying us with these simulation results from
CNB-QPM.
31rate response in GEM has been tuned to equal the response from CNB-QPM for the ßrst
three-quarters of the simulation horizon. The bottom lower panels compare the responses
of real GDP and CPI inàation. As Figure 3 shows, the GEM's theory-based dynamics
ßts quite well the reduced-form impulse responses at the CNB, and provides a satisfactory
representation of the monetary transmission mechanism as embedded in the tools for policy
evaluation currently in use in the Czech Republic.37 Notice that the responses of real GDP
and inàation occur slightly earlier in GEM because expenditure choices are not subject
to any decision lags. The introduction of predetermined expenditure38 would be necessary
in GEM to explain the type of dynamics that are quite common in empirically-motivated
reduced-form models.
3.5 Dynamic eÞects of a temporary interest rate hike
Table 3 reports the responses of key macro variables in our model to a 1-year hike in
the policy rate in the Foreign country, followed by reversal to the base-case Taylor rule.
Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001) consider the same experiment by using the ECB's Area-
Wide Model (AWM), whose empirical apparatus does not build upon a choice-theoretic
structural model. For comparison purposes, Table 3 also reports their estimates. As shown
in the Table, the responses for many aggregates display a very similar proßle and there are
only three noteworthy exceptions.
First, the response of investment is signißcantly longer-lived in AWM, reàecting signif-
icant accelerator eÞects that are not uncommon in empirical reduced-form models of the
monetary transmission mechanism. Such eÞects may be diácult to mimic in choice-theoretic
models of the business cycle and indeed may reàect a misattribution of the role of supply
37In future versions of GEM, the strategy of estimation will consider information provided by models like
CNB-QPM as priors, and then use Bayesian techniques to adjust these priors according to available data.
See Smets and Wouters (2002b) for an application of this approach to an SDGE model of the Euro area.
38See Woodford (2002) for a textbook treatment.
32shocks in reduced-form models that cause more persistent movements in investment, but
this remains an issue that needs to be addressed in future research.
The second diÞerence is the response of the exchange rate. In GEM the exchange rate
jumps more in the very short run than it does in AWM, reàecting rational behavior by
forward-looking market participants as opposed to the ad-hoc treatment of expectations in
empirical models. The third diÞerence is the response of imports, which is considerably
weaker in GEM than in AWM. This is not a surprise: the two-country GEM can only
account for bilateral trade between the small and large economies, while the simulation of
plausible imports dynamics in the Euro would require an analytical framework in which
trade linkages with third markets play a key role.39
4 Monetary policy rules
4.1 Taylor rules and Inàation-Forecast-Based rules
Over the last decade, the literature on the performance of interest rate rules in macroeco-
nomic models has principally focused on two types of rules, both extensively used in research
and policy analysis in central banks. The ßrst one is universally referred to as the Taylor
rule, following the seminal contribution by Taylor (1993) in which a simple interest rate re-
action function Ü which depended on contemporaneous values for inàation and the output
gap Ü provided a useful paradigm for thinking about monetary policy issues.40 The second
type of monetary policy rule has come to be known as an Inàation-Forecast-Based (IFB)
39A potentially problematic aspect that may deserve further study is the assumption in GEM that interest-
rate sensitive demand components such as investment expenditures have the same import propensity of
less-interest rate sensitive components. This extension may be incorporated into future versions of the
model.
40In simulation experiments with policy rules it is usually assumed that the policymaker knows the
contemporaneous values for inàation and the output gap, although in the real world even these variables
need to be estimated on the basis of available information.
33rule, although IFB rules are simply more Õforward-lookingÔ versions of the Taylor rule, as
the short-term policy rate is assumed to respond to a forecast of future inàation rather than
the contemporaneous level of inàation.41
Recalling expression (38) above, the specißc forms of the Taylor and IFB rules considered
in this paper can be nested into our general rule once we take into account the output gap.
We therefore deßne Ê(zt) = !2ygapt in equation (38), where !2 µ 0 and the output gap
ygap is deßned as the deviation of real GDP from the steady-state level implied by the
model. Note that, when !1;!2 = 0:5, and !i and ¼ are set to zero, expression (38) becomes
the original Taylor (1993) rule. Because the original contribution did not allow for inertia
in the interest rate, we will refer to Taylor rules with inertia (!i > 0) as Generalized Taylor
rules, or simply GT rules. By contrast, when ¼ > 0 we will refer to the rule as an IFB rule,
as the interest rate in this case depends on a forecast of the year-on-year inàation rate ¼
quarters into the future.
Taylor-style rules shed light on the fundamental role of monetary policy under a àexible
exchange rate regime, which is to adjust the policy rate in response to movements in inàation
as to provide an anchor for inàation and inàation expectations. Specißcally, in a class of
linear rational expectations models the asymptotic response of the policy rate with respect
to inàation has to be greater than one for these models to be saddle-point stable, and
response coeácients below one are associated with poor macroeconomic performance. This
stability property is sometimes referred to as the Taylor principle.42 In this paper we will
be relying upon linearized versions of GEM that satisfy the Taylor principle. Given our
41Based on some initial work at the Bank of Canada in the early 1990s, IFB rules have been used
extensively in central banks that have implemented inàation-targeting frameworks Ü see Laxton, Rose and
Tetlow (1993) and Black, Macklem and Rose (1997). For a critique of IFB rules and Taylor rules as well as
an alternative framework see Svensson (2003) and Svensson and Woodford (2003).
42See McCallum (2002) and Woodford (1999).
34specißcation, a necessary and suácient condition is that !1 > 0.43
A fairly comprehensive study by Levin, Wieland and Williams (2001) (hereinafter LWW)
examined the robustness of IFB rules in ßve macroeconomic models of the US economy. The
basic conclusion of their analysis was that IFB rules should respond to a one-year-ahead
forecast of inàation and the current output gap, and incorporate a substantial degree of
policy inertia. Indeed, the degree of inertia in the models that they studied was estimated
to be approximately 1, so LWW went on to formulate a very simple IFB rule of the following
form:
(1 + it+1)












We will refer to this simple rule as the LWW rule. A potentially important advantage of
the LWW rule is that it does not depend on any direct measure of the equilibrium real
interest rate, which could be a signißcant advantage for emerging economies that typically
experience large real interest rate àuctuations.44
4.2 Comparing optimally calibrated GT and IFB rules for the Home
country
Table 4 reports the results for GT rules in the Home country, optimally calibrated to min-
imize a standard loss function Ë that depends on the unconditional variances of inàation,
43The stability conditions in nonlinear models are more complicated. For example, using a nonlinear
model, Isard and Laxton (1999) show that the economy may enter the region of instability if the weight
on the output gap is too high relative to the weight on inàation, even if the weight on inàation is greater
than one. The emphasis on the Taylor rule and the Taylor principle has been instrumental in improving the
methodology that is used to build models for monetary policy analysis. For example, it was not uncommon
even as late as the 1980s to ßnd models in policy institutions that could be simulated with exogenous interest
rates. Such models by deßnition did not satisfy the Taylor principle.
44To the extent that measures of the equilibrium real interest rate are useful for forecasting future inàation,
or even measuring the output gap, it is not clear whether problems associated with uncertainty in the
equilibrium real interest rate can be overcome entirely by the simple LWW rule.
35output gap, and the ßrst diÞerence of interest rates.45 In the loss function the weight on
inàation variability is 1 and the weight on interest rate variability (Ëi) is 0.5. The four rows
in Table 4 report estimates that are based on varying the weight on the output gap (Ëygap)
in the objective function from 0.5 to 2.0 in increments of 0.5. As can be seen in the Table,
optimally calibrated GT rules result in signißcant inertia in the policy rate (estimates of !i
range from 0.91 to 0.93) and plausible coeácients on inàation and the output gap. Relative
to the Taylor (1993) rule and the LWW rule, the main diÞerence is that these rules place a
signißcantly higher weight on inàation vis-å a-vis the output gap.
Table 5 repeats the same exercise for an IFB rule that assumes that the policy rate
depends on the one-year-ahead forecast of future inàation Ü that is, ¼ = 4 in equation (38)
above. These results are interesting for a number of reasons. First, as in the LWW rule,
the parameter on the lagged interest rate term approaches its upper bound of 1.0. Second,
and unlike the LWW rule, which has equal weights on both inàation and output, this
rule suggests a considerably higher weight on the inàation forecast (the values of !1 range
from 1.78 to 1.92) than the output gap (the values of !2 range from 0.23 to 0.55). Third,
the outcomes for inàation and output variability do not vary signißcantly over diÞerent
specißcations of preferences, and in all cases the model generates almost the same variability
for inàation as it does for output. The only signißcant diÞerence is that a higher weight
on output variability in the objective function (Ëygap) results in a slightly higher level of
interest rate variability Ü which rises from 0.76 to 0.84 when Ëygap rises from 0.5 to 2.0.
Comparing the values of the loss functions in Table 4 and Table 5, it can be seen that
the IFB rule strictly dominates the GT rule46 and the diÞerence becomes wider the larger
the weight that is placed on output variability in the objective function. However, as can
be seen in the Tables, the IFB rule does not oÞer a substantial improvement over the GT




46This result is consistent with the ßndings of Batini, Harrison and Millard (2001).
36rule when one examines the underlying improvement in macro variability. This result is
consistent with other studies that ßnd that IFB rules oÞer a fairly small improvement over
GT rules in linearized models of the economy.47
4.3 Taylor eáciency frontiers
Figure 4 summarizes the main results of our paper. The curves plot the trade-oÞ between
output and inàation variability in both the Home and Foreign countries, based on the
GT rule that allows for interest rate smoothing. To make the trade-oÞs plausible and
comparable to other studies, they have been constructed based on an assumption that the
degree of interest rate variability (measured by the standard deviation of it+1   it) is less
than some critical level »Éi. We set the value for »Éi equal to 0.8 because this is roughly
consistent with the measures reported in Tables 4 and 5 under diÞerent assumptions about
preferences.48 The curves were generated by choosing the most eácient pairs of standard
deviations for inàation and output by searching over thousands of combinations of !i, !1
and !2 that were varied in increments of 0.01.
The implications of openness can be seen clearly in Figure 4. Moving upward and
eastward from the origin, Figure 4 ßrst plots the Taylor frontier for the Foreign country,
under our base-case set of assumptions for the distributions of the disturbance terms reported
in Table 2. Next, we ßnd the Taylor frontier for the Foreign country under the assumption
that the distributions of the shocks is the same as in the Home country.49 Finally we plot
47See for example Levin, Wieland and Williams (2001) and Taylor (2000). However, IFB rules have been
found to perform signißcantly better than Taylor rules in the presence of signißcant nonlinearities Ü see
Isard, Laxton and Eliasson (1999).
48This measure for interest rate variability is also roughly consistent with the degree of variability in
short-term interest rates in countries that have been successful in implementing either explicit or implicit
inàation targeting strategies.
49We discuss these results in Section 4.4.
37the Taylor frontier for the Home country. Because the Foreign country is assumed to be
relatively closed and exposed to smaller disturbances than the Home country, it is possible
for the GT rule to deliver much lower variability in both output and inàation in the Foreign
country than in the Home country.
4.3.1 Results for the relatively-closed Foreign country
The results reported in Figure 4 are consistent with previous studies of the robustness of
the LWW rule in diÞerent models of the US economy. First, the generalized Taylor rule
delivers low variability in both inàation and output. Second, and more importantly, the
simple LWW rule lies very close to the eáciency frontier of our economy. This provides
another conßrmation that a simple IFB rule which places a weight of 0.4 on both inàation
and output is robust across simulation models of a relatively closed economy, not necessarily
conßned to the US case.
Figure 4 also shows the values for output and inàation variability in the Foreign country
based on the original Taylor (1993) rule. As can be seen in the Figure, the Taylor rule
lies further away from the eáciency frontier than the LWW rule. Because the original
Taylor (1993) rule did not include interest rate smoothing, the distance between the point
associated with the original Taylor (1993) rule and the frontier can be interpreted as the
beneßts that can be derived by generating optimal inertia in the policy rate, as discussed
by Woodford (1999).
4.3.2 Results for the relatively-open Home country
We can now assess how rules designed for large and relatively closed economies perform
in a small and relatively open economy. The ßrst striking result is that both the original
Taylor (1993) rule and the LWW rule appear to be consistent with policy preferences that
place a very high weight on stabilizing output relative to inàation. Second, in this case the
LWW rule strictly dominates the Taylor (1993) rule. In fact, the LWW rule lies within the
38eáciency frontier that is generated on the basis of a generalized Taylor rule that allows for
inertia in the policy rate.
Figure 4 also includes another IFB rule with !i = 1; where the weights on output and
inàation have been optimized to minimize a standard loss function Ë that places equal
weights of 1 on both output and inàation variability and a weight of 1/2 on interest rate
variability (see row (2) of Table 5). We refer to this specißcation as the ÕoptimizedÔ LWW
rule. Relative to the original LWW rule, this calibration process produces a smaller weight
on the output gap (0.18) and a much larger weight on the deviation of one-year-ahead
inàation from target (1.87). According to the optimized LWW rule, the one-year-ahead
inàation forecast already embodies suácient information about the output gap, making the
output gap less important as a separate argument in the reaction function. Figure 4 shows
that the optimized LWW rule yields a signißcantly better macroeconomic performance than
GT rules.50
One obvious question remains to be answered before moving to the sensitivity analysis.
If rules designed for relatively closed economies do not result in good macroeconomic perfor-
mance in small, open economies, how do rules designed for small open economies perform in
relatively closed economies? Point A in Figure 4 provides a preliminary answer to this ques-
tion. It takes the LWW rule that has been optimized for the Home country and asks how
it might perform in a relatively closed economy such as the Foreign country of our model.
As can be seen in the Figure, the rule is eácient in the sense that it lies along the eáciency
frontier, but the aggressive response of this rule to inàation would only be consistent with
preferences that place a high weight on inàation variability relative to variability in output.
50Similar results characterize other studies of policy rules in emerging markets. For instance, in their
model of the Argentinian economy Ghironi and Rebucci (2002) show that, within the class of GT rules,
rules that place a large coeácient on inàation perform better.
394.4 Some sensitivity analysis
4.4.1 What accounts for a less favorable trade-oÞ in the small open economy?
To understand what accounts for the less favorable trade-oÞ in the relatively open economy
we regenerated the eáciency frontier for the relatively closed Foreign economy after imposing
the same assumptions on the stochastic disturbances that we used in the calibration of the
Home country. As can be seen in Figure 4, this shifts the eáciency frontier for the relatively
closed economy about two thirds of the distance toward the eáciency frontier derived for the
Czech Republic. The remaining gap reàects openness, or more precisely the larger eÞects
that Õrisk premiumÔ ßnancial shocks have on the Czech Republic as well as the eÞects of
disturbances that originate in the Euro area and are transmitted to the Czech Republic
through trade and macroeconomic linkages.
4.4.2 DiÞerent assumptions about the sensitivity of consumption to interest
rate changes
While our base-case assumptions for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution » and habit
persistence b help to match closely the properties of reduced-form, empirically-based models
of the monetary transmission mechanism, they are non-standard in the relevant literature,
which usually assumes an intertemporal elasticity of substitution close to one and signiß-
cantly lower habit persistence. The calculations reported in Table 4 were recomputed after
raising » from 1/3 to 0.99 and reducing the habit persistence parameter b from 0.95 to
0.85. Our results were not signißcantly aÞected by these changes. On balance, the new
parameterization reduces the lags in the monetary transmission mechanism and makes it
easier for monetary policy to deliver lower variability in output.
404.4.3 Is there a role for the exchange rate in monetary policy rules?
Several experiments were performed adding measures of exchange rate depreciation to the
set zt in (38), to evaluate if policy responses to exchange rate movements are able to
improve macroeconomic performance as measured by the loss functions in Tables 4 and
5. Thus far, the results suggest that there is a very small role for the exchange rate to
play in the linearized version of GEM even when there are signißcant adjustment costs to
export prices and short-run pass-through is relatively low. It may even be counterproductive
for monetary policy to react strongly to movements in the exchange rate, the information
content of which is already captured by either current or expected CPI inàation. These
results are prima facie consistent with other recent studies that have attempted to identify
a role for the exchange rate in reaction functions, but more work needs to be done to assess
whether or not this result is robust under alternative assumptions about the structure of
the economy and the form of the loss function that is used to evaluate alternative monetary
policy rules.
5 Conclusion
We have found that rules that perform well in models of the US economy also perform well
in our simulation model of a relatively closed economy. But some of these rules Ü such as
the original Taylor (1993) rule and the simple LWW rule Ü may be ineácient when they are
applied to small open economies because they respond too weakly to forecasts of inàation
and too strongly to movements in the output gap. However, we have shown that a simple
modißed LWW rule that responds more strongly to the forecast of inàation may produce
better macroeconomic performance in small, open, emerging economies.
A number of extensions and reßnements are left to future research. First, it may be
worthwhile to study the implications of alternative measures of the output gap based on
a àexible-price measure of potential output. Second, to be consistent with the historical
41data, our model was calibrated to account for high degrees of structural persistence in the
inàation process. However, as argued by Erceg and Levin (2001), estimates of inàation
persistence based on historical data, which cover periods of large disinàations, may overes-
timate the degree of structural inàation persistence, as the observed inàation inertia may
stem partly from a slow adaptation of expectations to the shift from a high to a low inàa-
tion regime. Therefore, further sensitivity analysis should consider this issue explicitly by
studying alternative calibrations with signißcantly lower structural inàation persistence.
Finally, the development of perturbation methods has progressed suáciently that formal
welfare analysis on the non-linear version of the model, regardless of its analytical complex-
ity, may soon become feasible. Looking forward to these developments, this study may
provide a useful benchmark to compare diÞerences between formal welfare analysis, based
on the non-linear version of the model, and the more conventional analysis presented here,
based on a simple loss function and the linearized version of the model.
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Measures of Macro Variability of the Euro Area and Czech Republic 
  Euro Area      Czech Republic 
 Historical  Model  Historical  Model 
  (1970Q1–2000Q4)   (1993Q1–2001Q4)  
Standard deviation (in %)         
Real GDP  1.0  1.1  2.0  2.0 
Consumption 0.8  1.2  2.2  2.8 
Investment 2.7  2.6  7.3  7.9 
Government Expenditure  0.6  0.7  2.6  2.6 
Exports 2.4  ...  3.9  4.1 
Imports 3.1  ...  4.1  3.5 
Net Exports (% of GDP)  0.6  ...  1.6  2.0 
CPI Inflation (y-o-y)  3.7  0.7  5.3  1.5 
Short-Term Interest Rate  2.9  1.1  4.1  2.0 




Assumptions About the Shocks 1/ 




  Home Foreign Home  Foreign 
Risk Premium  0.0170    0.70   
Productivity (LOG)  0.0020  0.0001  0.95  0.95 
Investment Depreciation Rate  0.0700  0.0050  0.95  0.95 
Marginal Utility of Consumption (LOG)  0.0040  0.0010  0.70  0.70 
Government Absorption/GDP  0.0035  0.0008  0.95  0.95 
Marginal Disutility of Labor (LOG)  0.1000  0.0100  0.95  0.95 
Preference Shifter (LOG)  0.0200  0.0180  0.95  0.95 
1/ Each variable is assumed to follow a stochastic process 
1 (1 )
y
tt t t yy y ε − =− Ψ + Ψ + , 
where y is either the variable or the log of the variable, y  is the steady-state value,  Ψ is a 
persistence parameter, and  y




A Comparison of GEM’s Monetary Transmission Mechanism with the ECB’s Area Wide Model (AWM) 


















Real GDP                 
  GEM Foreign  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3  -0.4  -0.3  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2 
  AWM  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3 
Domestic Absorption                 
  GEM Foreign  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2 
  AWM  -0.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.5  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4 
Consumption                
  GEM Foreign  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2 
  AWM  -0.0  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3 
Investment                
  GEM Foreign  -0.6  -0.9  -1.1  -1.1  -1.0  -0.8  -0.6  -0.4 
  AWM  -0.1  -0.5  -0.8  -1.2  -1.5  -1.4  -1.3  -1.2 
Exports                
  GEM Foreign  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  -0.0 
  AWM  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1 
Imports                
  GEM Foreign  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
  AWM  -0.2  -0.5  -0.7  -0.9  -0.9  -0.7  -0.6  -0.6 
Exchange Rate                 
  GEM Foreign  0.9  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
  AWM  0.5  0.3  0.0  -0.2  -0.5  -0.4  -0.4  -0.3 
CPI                
  GEM Foreign  -0.0  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2 




Table 4. Optimal Calibrations of Generalized Taylor Rules fo the Home Country 
 
  Loss Function 1/  Optimal Weights 2/  Measures of Macro Variability 
 
ygap Λ   i Λ   Λ   i ω   1 ω   2 ω  
4 (/ ) tt PP σ
−   ygap σ   i σ ∆  
1  0.50  0.50  4.98 0.91 0.42 0.13 1.63  1.99  0.83 
2  1.00  0.50  6.88 0.92 0.40 0.18 1.70  1.92  0.79 
3  1.50  0.50  8.68 0.92 0.39 0.22 1.77  1.87  0.78 
4  2.00  0.50  10.40  0.93 0.39 0.26 1.84  1.83  0.77 
1/ Loss function is  22 2
41 (/ ) ( ) ( ) t t ygap i t t PP y g a p i i σσ σ −+ Λ= +Λ +Λ −  
2/ Reaction function is 
44 4
1 41 4 2 (1 ) 1 [(1 ) 1] (1 ) [(1 / ) ( / ) 1] [ / ] [ ] ti t i t t t t t t ii P P P P y g a p ωω β ω ω + −− +− = + − + − − + − Π +
  
 
Table 5.  Optimal Calibrations of Inflation-Forecast-Based Rules for the Home Country 
 
  Loss Function 1/  Optimal Weights 2/  Measures of Macro Variability 
 
ygap Λ   i Λ   Λ   i ω   1 ω   2 ω  
4 (/ ) tt PP σ
−   ygap σ   i σ ∆  
1  0.50  0.50  4.97 1.00 1.78 0.23 1.78  1.74  0.76 
2  1.00  0.50  6.47 1.00 1.87 0.34 1.78  1.73  0.80 
3  1.50  0.50  7.95 1.00 1.91 0.44 1.79  1.71  0.82 
4  2.00  0.50  9.41 1.00 1.92 0.55 1.81  1.70  0.84 
1/ Loss function is  22 2
41 (/ ) ( ) ( ) t t ygap i t t PP y g a p i i σσ σ −+ Λ= +Λ +Λ −  
2/ Reaction function is 
44 4




















































































































































































































)Figure 2: Foreign Country: Permanent One Percentage Point
Disinflation Shock
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CPI Inflation (y-o-y)Figure 3. A Comparison of a Disinflation Shock in the Home Country of GEM and 
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GEM’s Home Country Czech National Bank’s Quarterly Projection Model
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CPI Inflation (y-o-y)  (deviation from control)Figure 4: A Comparison of the Taylor-Rule Based Output-Inflation Efficiency
Frontiers for the Home Country and the Foreign Country
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Standard deviation of output